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shortest path routing when configured to provide near
complete anonymity against our chosen attacker, and we in-
clude mechanisms to exchange anonymity for performance.
We have demonstrated key aspects of the feasibility and
effectiveness of this direction and hope this this motivates
serious consideration of privacy as a requirement in the
development of other next-generation routing protocols.
We do not advocate an Internet without identity. Rather,
we propose that identity exposure be reserved for substan-
tial relationships and avoided for ephemeral relationships.
This research direction is still in its infancy, and much work
remains. We believe the most pressing matter is to develop
diversity in the solution space by considering how privacy-
preserving features might be integrated into other leading
layer 3 proposals. Beyond this, there are user interface
questions to explore in the provision of clear and mean-
ingful network privacy choices and in characterizing the
user response to these choices. This characterization will
provide a better understanding of the resource requirements
for network layer anonymity systems and of the motivations
for service providers. Finally, further work remains with the
Dovetail protocol. Network latency information should be
incorporated into both the path selection algorithms and the
anonymity assessments. Our evaluation should be extended
to a wider range of network assumptions and additional
privacy/performance settings.
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